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PREVIEW—Lac Courte Orielles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers:
Just How Special is Indian Law?
Zachary Michael Krumm*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit will
hear oral arguments on Monday, November 8, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. at the
Everett McKinley Dirksen Courthouse in Chicago, Illinois. Vanya S.
Hogen will likely argue for the Appellants, four bands of the Lake Superior
Chippewa tribes, and Wisconsin Attorney General Joshua L. Kaul will
likely argue for the Appellee, State of Wisconsin and Wisconsin towns.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case1 tests a long-standing historical tension in Indian law:
How faithfully should the courts apply the special Indian canons of
construction when they conflict with principles of common law?2 The
canons, established long ago by the Supreme Court as bedrock notions of
federal common law, supersede normal rules of statutory construction.3
The primary canon, for example, instructs courts to read Indian treaties as
their tribal signatories would have understood them.4 This case asks
whether a basic real property notion—that taxability runs with ownership
in fee—ought to stand as practically its own canon, effectively reversing
the Indian canon deference formula. Recent precedent suggests yes.5 Or,
should the courts more strictly apply the canons analysis and consider the
issue in terms of treaty rights, clear Congressional intent, and give
deference to the Indians?
Four bands of Lake Superior Chippewa tribes in northern
Wisconsin (the “Tribes”) brought this action in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Wisconsin seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against

*Juris Doctor Candidate 2023, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the
University of Montana.
1.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wisconsin v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2021)
2.
For a brief overview of the Indian canons, see NELL JESSUP
NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02 (2019). In
depth discussion of the canons and their relationship to constitutional law can be found
at Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100 (2013).
3.
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
4.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 582.
5.
E.g., Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524
U.S. 103, 110–11 (1998); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 262 (1992).
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the State of Wisconsin.6 Appealing now to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, the Tribes contend that the State cannot impose ad
valorem property taxes7 on former allotted land on the reservation held in
fee simple by their members.8 The Tribes say that treaty rights guarantee
them a “permanent home” immune from taxation and that Congress never
abrogated that treaty right9 as would be required by the Indian canons.10
The State, for its part, argues that the alienation principle should control
as a matter of settled law: Alienation abrogates treaty rights and allows
states to tax Indian lands as soon as they pass into non-member hands.11
Wisconsin, therefore may tax tribal lands held at any time by nonIndians.12
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The conflict here implicates nearly 200 years of tribal–U.S.
relations, with the determinative era running from early treaty-making in
the 1840s13 to the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) and the end of
allotment in the 1930s.14 No party disputes the facts of the case.15
After a series of treaties resulted in forced removal and loss of
land for the Tribes, the Tribes signed a treaty with the U.S. in 1854 (the
“Treaty”) granting them a “permanent home” on new reservations near
Lac De Flambeau and Lac Courte Orielle in Wisconsin.16 There is no
evidence that the Tribes either owned land in fee simple or understood fee
ownership or taxation of land at the time.17 There is evidence, however,
that they expected they would not lose control of the land on the new
6.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Lac Courte Orielles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. July 8,
2021), ECF No. 21.
7.
Ad valorem taxes are assessed proportional to the value of the thing
being taxed, in this case property values. See 71 AM. JUR. 2d State and Local Taxation
§ 81 (Westlaw through 2021).
8.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19–20, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
9.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
10.
Id.
11.
See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524
U.S. 103, 110–11 (1998); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 262 (1992).
12.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 14–15, Lac Courte
Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin. v. Evers, No. 211817 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021), ECF No. 36.
13.
E.g., Treaty with the Chippewa, 1842, Chippewa-U.S., Oct. 4,
1842, 7 Stat. 591; Treaty with the Chippewa, 1854, Chippewa-U.S., Sept. 30, 1854,
10 Stat. 1109.
14.
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 5101–5105 (2018).
15.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *1 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2021)
16.
Treaty with the Chippewa, 1854 Art. 3, supra note 13, at 1110.
17.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11–12, Lac Courte Orielles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin. v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. July
8, 2021), ECF No. 21.
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reservation under any circumstances.18 Indeed, they ceded their former
territory for pennies an acre to secure that right.19 The Tribes contended
below, and the lower court agreed, that the “permanent home” provision
implied immunity from taxation.20
Also central to this case is the fact that the Treaty allowed the
President to allot 80-acre parcels to individual tribal members in fee
simple,21 which the Executive later did at the behest of the Tribes
themselves. They had depended on the sale of timber from their lands, title
to which was held in trust by the federal government prior to allotment.
But in 1873, the Supreme Court in United States v. Cook22 declared timber
a part of the ground real estate, meaning the Tribes had no title to it.
Around the same time, annuity payments that the Tribes had negotiated
under treaty ended, and the federal government prevented them from
hunting, fishing, or gathering off-reservation.23 Facing starvation, the
Tribes lobbied the President to allot their lands so they could harvest
timber again. 24
Nothing in the Treaty allotment provisions, though, addresses
state jurisdiction.25 This stands in contrast to the General Allotment Act
(“GAA”), sweeping legislation passed in 1887, which applied across
Indian Country and granted allottees citizenship and all its “rights,
privileges, and immunities.”26 After passage of that Act, the Executive
determined that the Tribes’ lands did not fit the criteria for GAA land and
allotted them by Executive Order instead, placing those parcels beyond the
ambit of the GAA.27 In 1905, Congress through the Burke Act amended
the GAA, subjecting every allottee who receives a patent in fee “to the
laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may
reside.”28
Following guidance by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
the State chose to tax both post-GAA allotments and those which were
allotted pre-GAA under the Treaty, but had since had at least one nonIndian owner.29 The Tribes paid the taxes in protest and sued for

18.
Id. at 10–12.
19.
Id. at. 21.
20.
Lac Courte, 2021 WL at *7.
21.
Treaty with the Chippewa, 1854 Art. 3, supra note 13, at 1110.
22.
86 U.S. 591 (1873).
23.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 13, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
24.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12–13, Lac Courte Orielles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin. v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. July
8, 2021), ECF No. 21.
25.
Id.
26.
General Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 49-105, § 6, 24 Stat. 388
(1887).
27.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
28.
Burke Act, Pub. L. No. 59-149, 34 Stat. 182 (1906).
29.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wisconsin v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *3 (W.D.
Wis. Apr. 9, 2021).
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declaratory and injunctive relief.30 Since none of the material facts are in
dispute,31 both parties made cross-motions for summary judgment.32
The district court agreed with the Tribes that the Treaty’s
“permanent home” provision exempted their lands from state taxation, and
that the GAA never applied to them.33 Finding no other clear example of
legislative intent by Congress to tax those lands, the court also agreed the
Tribes’ lands provisionally remained immune to taxation, so long as they
had always remained in Indian hands.34
However, the court could not ignore the common law principle
that “taxability ordinarily flows from alienability.”35 In a string of cases
stating the grammatical reverse of the Indian canon formula—favoring
tribes absent congressional action to the contrary—the Supreme Court has
said alienated lands are presumptively taxable, unless Congress clearly
states otherwise,36 because it would be “strange” for Congress to make
Indian land alienable but not taxable.37 The district court followed this line
of Supreme Court cases, holding that non-Indian ownership “severs the tie
between land and treaty” and that only the Tribes’ fee land which had
never passed into non-Indian hands remained immune.38 The Tribes appeal
that holding to the Seventh Circuit.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Consistent with its minimalist view of the Indian canons, the State
argues its case on appeal as a matter of settled precedent.39 The Tribes,
meanwhile, insist that the law as applied must defer to the canons, which
demand a fact-specific inquiry.40 Regardless of paradigm, both hinge on
the ultimate applicability of Cass County and the question of whether nonIndian ownership of fee lands on the reservation vanquishes treaty rights.41

30.
Id.
31.
Id. at *2.
32.
Id. at *12.
33.
Id. at *10.
34.
Id.
35.
Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S.
103, 104 (1998).
36.
See id. at 103; County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146
(1906).
37.
Goudy, 203 U.S. at 149.
38.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *11–12 (W.D.
Wis. Apr. 9, 2021) (citing Cass County, 524 U.S. 103 (1998)).
39.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 19, Lac Courte
Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817
(7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021), ECF No. 36.
40.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22–23, Lac Courte Orielles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. July
8, 2021), ECF No. 21.
41.
Lac Courte, 2021 WL at *1.
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A. Appellants’ Argument
Asserting that the Indian canons control the analysis,42 the Tribes
argue that (1) the 1854 Treaty precludes taxation of Indian-owned land on
the reservation; (2) prior non-Indian ownership has no bearing on the
taxability of current Indian lands; and 3) only Congress can authorize state
taxation of Indian land, but in this case never did.
1. The Treaty as Barrier to Taxation
First, the Tribes say that the Treaty, properly interpreted, creates
a right to a “permanent home” which would be unlawfully threatened by
the possibility of forfeiture associated with state taxes.43 When looking to
treaty rights, the Indian canons require courts to interpret provisions “as
the Indians themselves would have understood them.”44 Here, though the
lower court was “skeptical of attempts to ascribe specific knowledge or
intent to the Indians,”45 the Tribes introduced substantial evidence showing
both the original Indian signatories and the American negotiators intended
for the Tribes to hold their land “as long as there is one Indian left.”46 For
example, in the year leading up to negotiation of the Treaty, Indian Agent
Henry Gilbert wrote that removal was “the great terror of their lives.”47
They would sooner face “extermination than . . . comply with it.”48
Since the original signatories contemplated neither alienation nor
taxation, the Tribes argue they could not have considered that one would
lead to the other.49 And because the Indian canons require treaty provisions
be interpreted liberally in favor of the Indians,50 proper reading leaves no
room for even preliminary application of Cass County.51 Taxation would
eviscerate the core treaty promise of a permanent home.52
42.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
43.
Id. at 21; Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4–5, Lac Courte
Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817
(7th Cir. Sept. 24, 2021), ECF No. 51. Forfeiture would occur if a tribal member
owning land in fee fell behind on their state property taxes and the state decided to
foreclose.
44.
Id. at 23 (quoting Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999)).
45.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *5 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2021)
46.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 24–28, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817;
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 8–13, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
47.
Id. at 26.
48.
Id. at 26–27.
49.
Id. at 29.
50.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
576 (1908).
51.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
52.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 28, Lac Courte Orielles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. July 8,
2021), ECF No. 21.
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2. Whether Alienability Abrogates the Treaty Right
The district court agreed with the Tribes’ view that the Treaty
granted them state property tax immunity,53 but disagreed that the
immunity could survive once land was allotted and sold to non-members.54
The court below apparently considered the possibility that the Treaty could
prevent application of the holding in Cass County, but concluded it would
be “a stretch” to think the original Indian signatories had no idea nonIndian acquisition of tribal lands would “compromise the permanency”
found in the Treaty.55
The Tribes contend, however, that signatories on both sides
believed the Tribes would retain their rights regardless of whether “parcels
of . . . land might be acquired by non-Indians from time to time.”56 For
instance, Indian Commissioner Manypenny told the Tribes as long as they
were “satisfied for [the White Man] to stay he might, but the moment you
wish him to go he would go.”57 In effect, the State and lower court’s view
would allow single tribal members to permanently extinguish the treaty
rights of the entire tribe, solely by transferring parcels of land.58 This, the
Tribes say, is particularly egregious because parcels were sometimes
transferred involuntarily, such as by foreclosure, or by virtue of intestate
succession to non-member family.59
The State relies on Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation60 and Montana v. United States61 for its position that
alienation of allotment land is “necessarily a surrender of the tax
exemption attached” because tribal authority to exclude is lost when
access to land is granted to non-members. 62 The State then cites Cass
County for the explicit principle that tribal repurchase of alienated land
cannot restore treaty protection.63 In opposition, the Tribes here argue that
53.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *7 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2021).
54.
Id. at *11.
55.
Id.
56.
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12–14, Lac Courte Orielles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir.
Sept. 24, 2021), ECF No. 51; accord. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 29, Lac Courte,
No. 21-1817.
57.
Id.
58.
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Lac Courte, No. 211817.
59.
Id. at 14.
60.
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
61.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
62.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 22, Lac Courte
Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817
(7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021), ECF No. 36 (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S. at 424).
63.
Id. at 25–26 (citing Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 114 (1998)).
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none of the three cases apply.64 Montana and Brendale, they say, were
decisions about the scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on nonIndian fee land, which is quite limited.65 Cass County, the Tribes argue,
was an instance of congressional authorization to tax, as opposed to
Executive action66—a crucial distinction covered in detail below .
The State points out that the Tribes’ theory would prevent states
from taxing even reservation fee land owned by non-Indians,67 an ability
neither party questions,68 but the Tribes say such thinking is “an enormous
leap.”69 The Tribes instead suggest that the signatories only negotiated
rights for Indians themselves.70 Where allotted land passes to non-Indians,
its non-Indian owners never possessed treaty rights in the first place, so
remain subject to state taxation.71
3. Whether Congress alone can authorize state taxation
Regardless of the persistence of applicable treaty rights, the Tribes
assert that their lands remain categorically tax-exempt72 until Congress
authorizes taxation in an “unmistakably clear” way.73 They say it has not.74
Distinguishing Cass County, the Tribes suggest that Congress, and only
Congress, may grant state taxing authority.75 That case dealt with lands
allotted under the General Allotment Act where explicit language made

64.

Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Lac Courte, No. 21-

1817.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 15–16.
67.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 23–24, Lac Courte,
No. 21-1817.
68.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *10 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2021)
69.
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, Lac Courte Orielles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir.
Sept. 24, 2021), ECF No. 51.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 15–16.
72.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 31, Lac Courte Orielles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. July 8,
2021), ECF No. 21 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,
458–59 (1995)).
73.
Id. (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759,
765 (1985)).
74.
Id. at 40.
75.
Id. at 37–38; Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19–20, Lac
Courte Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No.
21-1817 (7th Cir. Sept. 24, 2021), ECF No. 51.
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the lands taxable.76 In this case, the Tribes’ lands were allotted by
Executive Order under the terms of the Treaty.77
The Court in Cass County makes the broad assertion that “when
Congress makes reservation lands freely alienable, it is unmistakably clear
that Congress intends that land to be taxable,”78 but the Tribes say only
Congress itself can do that, due to its unique plenary powers over Indians.79
Indeed, there is evidence that the United States government represented its
power as such to the Tribes, who reported Agent Gilbert as saying “there
is no one who can invalidate our transactions, even [ the President].”80
The district court thought the distinction between Congress and
the Executive was negligible, since “all agree” that transfer to non-Indian
ownership makes the property taxable by the State.81 But the Tribes insist
the distinction consistently matters in state-tribal tax cases.82 Where other
types of tax are at issue, such as those on goods or personal property on
the reservation, courts look only to congressional authorization.83 They
have never required tribal members to “prove that the motor vehicle,
gasoline, cigarette, or real property they are purchasing or using has
always been in the hands of Indians” in order to be exempt.84
In sum, the Tribes believe that the State’s “matter of law”
approach in applying Cass County is wrong because: (1) a proper Indian
canon analysis of the 1854 Treaty means alienability alone cannot
extinguish its rights, making Cass County inapplicable; and (2) if one were
to apply Cass County, only congressional enactment of allotment is
sufficient to imbue taxation,85 and Congress had no part in allotment of the
Tribes’ lands.86

76.
Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S.
103, 106–108 (1998).
77.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *1 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2021).
78.
524 U.S. at 104.
79.
Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22, Lac Courte, No. 211817.
80.
Id. at 11.
81.
Lac Courte, 2021 WL 1341819 at *11–12.
82.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 39–40, Lac Courte Orielles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. Aug.
27, 2021), ECF No. 36; Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22–23, Lac Courte
Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817
(7th Cir. Sept. 24, 2021), ECF No. 51.
83.
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 39, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817; Reply
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23–24, Lac Courte, No. 21-1817.
84.
Id. at 40.
85.
Id. at 37–38.
86.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL 1341819, *11 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 9, 2021).
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B. Appellees’ Argument
The State asserts that the Indian canons cannot overcome the clear
precedent set by Cass County and its forebears.87 It argues that (1) as a
matter of law, tribal lands become taxable as soon as they pass into nonIndian hands, regardless of subsequent Indian re-acquisition; and (2) the
Indian canons do not override the rule that alienation imbues taxation.
1. The status of treaty rights post-alienation
While the State accepts the general categorical rule that states
cannot tax Indians in Indian country without clear congressional
authorization, it views land as a special case.88 Relying on Montana and
Brendale, the State argues that rights “with respect to reservation lands
must be read in light of . . . subsequent alienation.”89 Since alienation
necessarily transfers the right of exclusive use and possession, as soon as
fee land on the reservation passes into nonmember hands, that aspect of
applicable treaty rights ceases to have force.90
The State considers the context in which the Treaty was signed,
and any evidence of its signatories’ intent, to be mere “historical matters
of fact.”91 Even taking the Tribes’ historical evidence as fact, the State
says92 that alienated land remains taxable as a matter of law. Arguing that
treaty rights as they relate to land are predicated on a tribe’s exclusive use
and occupation,93 the State asserts, quoting Brendale, that tribal tax
immunity is “necessarily overcome by an ‘implic[it] grant’ of access to the
land.”94 This position departs markedly from the Tribes’, which argues that
the only limiting factor on treaty rights is necessarily the will of
Congress.95
Given that treaty rights must be read “in light of the subsequent
alienation of those lands,”96 the State concludes that alienation to non87.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 18, Lac Courte
Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817
(7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021), ECF No. 36.
88.
Id.
89.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 21, Lac Courte, No.
21-1817 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981)).
90.
Id. at 22–23.
91.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 20, Lac Courte
Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817
(7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021), ECF No. 36.
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 22.
94.
Id. at 22 (quoting Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 424 (1989)).
95.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21–22, Lac Courte Orielles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, No. 21-1817 (7th Cir. July
8, 2021), ECF No. 21.
96.
Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 23, Lac Courte, No.
21-1817 (quoting Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981)).
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Indians removes tribal land from federal protection,97 subjecting it to latent
state jurisdiction, which does not end at the reservation’s border.98 Were
that not so, on-reservation fee land owned by nonmembers still would
remain tax free under the Treaty; yet even the Tribes admit that land is
taxable.99
Reflecting the difficulty of reconciling the Indian canons with
common law property principles,100 the State’s argument neatly mirrors the
Tribes’: Whereas the Tribes believe the canons-as-applied put up a wall
preventing the usual transformation of rights by alienation, the State
argues alienation itself precludes application of the canons, and thus the
factual treaty analysis is unnecessary and inapplicable.101
But what if non-Indian fee lands are re-purchased by tribal
members? Would that bring them back under federal protection vis-à-vis
the Treaty? The State argues, categorically, no.102 Cass County plainly
rejected that assertion, after it had been reached by the Eighth Circuit.103
Instead, tribally-owned lands held at one time by non-members would
need to be placed back into federal ownership in trust.104
In rebuttal to the Tribes’ argument that Presidential allotment of
tribal lands distinguishes Cass County from this case, the State argues
Cass County applies to all alienated land in Indian Country, regardless of
the source of allotment.105 The State explains that references to Congress’s
intent in Cass County merely reflect “the historical facts of that case.”106
Though the facts there did not require the Court to pass judgment on treatyallotted lands, it in no way limited its holding to particular modes of
allotment.107
Along these lines, the State is quick to point out that other broad
Indian legislation supports its reading of Congress’s intent over time with
regard to alienability and its effects on treaty protections.108 It notes, as the
opinion in Cass County did,109 that “dormant” tax immunity on allotted
lands would “render superfluous” provisions of the IRA, the major piece
97.
Id. at 22.
98.
Id. at 26–27.
99.
Id. at 23–24. See also Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin v. Evers, 18-CV-992-JDP, __F.Supp.3d__, 2021 WL
1341819, *5 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 9, 2021).
100.
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Id. at 26 (citing Cass County, 524 U.S. at 114–15).
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Id. at 26–27.
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of federal Indian legislation that officially ended allotment.110 Those
provisions explicitly grant tribal fee lands federal protection from state
taxation if the Secretary of Interior brings them back into the federal trust
on behalf of the tribes.111 The State says this is further proof that Congress
always intended alienation of fee lands to end treaty protection.112
2. Whether the Indian canons separately prevent taxation of re-acquired
Indian allotment land
To answer the question of whether former non-Indian fee land on
the reservation regains tax immunity when acquired by Indians, the State
applies the balancing test from White Mountain Apache v. Bracker,113
which declares that states may tax property on the reservation owned by
non-Indians unless the tax is pre-empted by federal law or infringes on the
rights of tribes to “make their own laws and be governed by them.” 114
Whereas the Tribes would place such property beyond the ambit of treaty
rights in the first place,115 and keeping the categorical approach for
reacquired Indian land,116 the State would limit the categorical rule to
instances where reservation land has never passed into non-Indian
hands.117
Since the State takes a broad reading of Cass County, assuming
that alienability automatically erases treaty tax protection, it does not
consider it necessary to look at the source of allotment,118 as one might
when applying the Indian canons in search of congressional intent under
the categorical rule.119 Indeed, under the State’s theory, the question of
whether “Congress” in Cass County should be read broadly or narrowly
no longer matters.
Curiously, the Sixth Circuit in Keweenaw Bay Indian Community
v. Naftaly,120 which the district court followed in considering whether the
110.
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220 (1959)).
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Tribes retained tax immunity for fee lands under continuous Indian
ownership,121 did address the meaning of “Congress” issue from Cass
County. That court concluded that only Congress, and not the Executive,
could revoke tax immunity through allotment.122 The district court, though,
went the other way, deciding that alienation makes tribal land taxable
where Congress does not.123
Since the State broadly applies the rule in Cass County, it cements
its argument by pointing to practical and conflict-of-laws concerns.124
Noting that a “statute should not be construed in a way that would make
any part of it superfluous, void, or insignificant,”125 the State argues that
tying taxability of Indian land to its location and identity of its owner
would render the statutory process for returning Indian land back to federal
trust “partially superfluous.”126
In addition, the State says that Congress required the Secretary of
the Interior to carefully consider “jurisdictional problems and potential
conflicts of land use” inherent in tribes expanding their sovereignty,
because that process is fraught with complexities.127 Allowing tribal land
to automatically regain tax immunity when title is re-acquired by members
would allow tribes to circumvent Congress’s concerns and will.128 The
State urges the court here to avoid such practical and interpretive
quagmires.129
Underscoring the conflicts that arise when the Indian canons
intersect with other areas of common law, the State makes a strong
preference for rules-based precedent, rather than the historically factintensive approach favored by the Tribes. It ultimately argues in that vein
that the Tribes cannot escape settled black letter law by invoking the
Indian canons. The 1854 Treaty, the State contends, permanently lost its
force as soon non-Indians acquired fee lands, regardless of how it was
allotted, and no special interpretation of settled precedent (such as Cass
County) can change that fact.
IV. ANALYSIS
In a narrow sense, the issue in Lac Courte Orielle focuses on a
discrete, straightforward question: Do fee lands on a reservation, allotted
by treaty, maintain their tax-free status so long as a member of the tribe
121.
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
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holds title? An initial reading of the primary on-point authority—Goudy
v. Meath130 and subsequently County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation131 and Cass County132—suggests an
equally simple answer: No. Indeed, it seems likely that, given the strength
of the language in Yakima and, in particular, Cass County, the Seventh
Circuit will affirm the lower court.
Yet full resolution of the issue implicates questions more central
to Indian law. The Seventh Circuit may need to wrestle with many of them.
For instance, should the Indian canons of construction be applied
consistently, with each new case potentially yielding a fact-specific
inquiry? If so, how wide of a lens should courts employ when searching
for “unmistakably clear” evidence that Congress intends to abrogate a
treaty right? Did the Court mean only congressional intent, as the Sixth
Circuit suggests,133 or any federal government action, so long as it appears
sufficiently explicit? Could it be time for the Supreme Court to revisit Cass
County and the ambiguous reasoning from Goudy that it rests on? This
section discusses how each of these questions frames the case in context.
A. Evolution of the Alienability Doctrine: Clear Rule or Historical
Anomaly?
Cass County sets out the strongest position for the State: "When
Congress makes reservation lands freely alienable, it is unmistakably clear
that Congress intends that land to be taxable by state and local
governments, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested.”134
This reads like a broad rule, dependent only on the condition of
alienation. Yet compare the language to the Indian canon formula in
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona: “Indians and Indian
property on an Indian reservation are not subject to state taxation except
by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act of
Congress.”135
The presumption there is in favor of the tribes, and more than an
inference is required to dislodge that presumption.136 At a minimum,
Congress must “actually consider[] the conflict between its action . . . and
Indian treaty rights.”137 In fact, McGirt v. Oklahoma suggests that
Congress outright “must say so.”138 Yet the formulation in Cass County is
the reverse: Alienation itself creates a presumption of congressional intent,
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which must then be overcome by “clearly manifest” evidence.139 This
holding makes applying the Indian canons difficult, since the canons
provide a “backdrop” to interpreting applicable treaties and federal
statutes.140
So how did the Court in Cass County end up with a rule
approaching something like its own pseudo-Indian canon? The Court first
addressed the issue in Goudy, a case decided 90 years earlier, which
evaluated a treaty provision exempting allotments from encumbrance or
sale until the state legislature and Congress agreed to remove such
restrictions.141 In 1887, the GAA subjected nearly all Indian allottees to the
laws of the state in which they resided.142 Then in 1889, the new state of
Washington, per the treaty, granted all allottees alienation “in like manner
and with the same effect” as other citizens, removing “all restrictions in
reference thereto,” and Congress assented.143 Without citing authority, the
Goudy Court reasoned it would be “strange” to withdraw federal
protection without granting state taxation.144
While such an inference might be reasonable, it is not the standard
demanded by the Indian canons as articulated by Chief Justice John
Marshall.145 Still, though the Goudy Court failed to conduct the factual
analysis required for proper deference to the original Indian
understanding,146 it did look for specific congressional intent superseding
the treaty, which it found in the GAA’s broad grant of state jurisdiction.147
Yakima similarly involved interpretation of the GAA.148 There, the
Court conducted a canons analysis,149 but once again seized on the
alienation principle as its main authority, rather than specific evidence of
congressional intent in the statute.150 The GAA provisions subjecting
allottees to state laws, it said, only “made this implication of § 5 [rendering
patented allotments free of encumbrances] explicit.”151
Thus, by the time the Court faced the issue again in Cass County,
it determined its Indian canon analysis could end as soon as it found
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congressional intent to make the Indian lands in question alienable.152 That
approach conflicts with the letter and spirit of the Indian canons, making
it challenging for lower courts to reconcile, as it could be in this case.
B. Alienability in Other Areas of Indian Law
In addition to being difficult to square with the Indian canons, the
notion that non-Indian ownership severs treaty rights does not easily
reconcile with other areas of Indian law. For instance, a major rationale
for the alienation “canon” is that by allowing alienation, Congress intends
to withdraw federal protection from those lands.153 Yet the Supreme Court
has held that treaty rights can remain even after a tribe is terminated by
Congress.154 Surely total termination of tribal status expresses a stronger
withdrawal of federal protection than alienation.
In another example, Congress passed an act appropriating the
Black Hills in South Dakota from the Sioux, which effectively abrogated
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868.155 After repeated takings claims brought
by the tribe, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that the tribe had a valid
claim for compensation based on recognized title to lands established
under treaty.156 There, the act of Congress legitimized non-Indian
ownership in the same way that alienation under allotment does, but the
Court reached a different conclusion.
Montana v. United States, the seminal case dealing with tribal
authority over non-Indian fee land, involved the Crow Tribe’s attempts to
regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers within the reservation’s
boundaries.157 There, the Court once again considered treaty rights “in light
of the subsequent alienation” of fee lands,158 ruling that the tribe could not
regulate nonmember conduct on fee land owned by nonmembers.159 It did
not, however, articulate whether its analysis rested on the status of the
land, identity of the hunter or fisher, identity of the landowner, or some
combination thereof. Instead, the Court addressed possible sources of
tribal authority in turn: (1) the tribe could not rely on the property right of
exclusion to regulate nonmembers on non-Indian fee land,160 nor (2) could
its powers of inherent sovereignty reach there, with few narrow
exceptions.161
Indeed, Montana seems to suggest that the status of individuals
(both actor and owner) is the primary concern. When considering whether
152.
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a relevant statute granted the Crow regulatory authority, the Court said it
was limited to Indian land, and that “if Congress wished to extend tribal
jurisdiction to lands owned by non-Indians, it could have easily done
so.”162 But the Court was only presented with one category: Nonmember
activity on nonmember owned fee land. Regardless of rationale, it could
definitely say that zone resides within the faintest reach of tribal
sovereignty.163
The State here argues that since it is well-established states can
tax non-Indian fee lands on the reservation, there must be some aspect of
treaty abrogation tied to land status, otherwise all reservation fee lands
would be untaxable.164 Similarly, the Court in Yakima articulated that
property taxing authority flows from the status of the land itself, rather
than the tribal status of its owner, making once-alienated Indian land
permanently subject to taxation.165 This principle seems hard to reconcile
with the above examples, in which treaty rights apparently turned on
whether the individual (or tribe) retained the right(s), not the status of the
land itself. It may be time to rework the courts’ insistence on a different
formula for alienated Indian land.166
C. The Circuit Split: Does “Congress” Mean Congress?
The Sixth Circuit in Naftaly attempted to circumvent the
alienation versus canons problem by distinguishing between lands allotted
by the Executive under treaty and those allotted by Congress.167 Since the
rule in Cass County predicates on Congress making lands alienable, the
Naftaly court decided Cass County did not apply to instances such as the
Treaty at issue here, because the Treaty provided for allotment, not
Congress. Naftaly may be the future; the Supreme Court denied certiorari
on the case. Since it happened to analyze lands allotted under the same
Treaty, it should be quite persuasive to the Seventh Circuit here.
That said, the district court here found the distinction immaterial,
reasoning essentially that the fact of alienation itself irreversibly severs the
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land from treaty rights, making the source of Congress’ intent moot.168
That logic, however, seems backwards: If alienation could per se abrogate
a treaty right, the Court would have had no need to keep citing the rule that
state taxation is not allowed unless Congress makes its intent
“unmistakably clear.”169 A plain reading of Yakima and Cass County, to
the contrary, treats alienation, not the act of abrogation, as presumptive
evidence of the requisite congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights.170
In supporting its distinction, the Naftaly court argues that a treaty
by its very nature cannot express the will of Congress.171 It requires only
ratification by one house, and the fact that its provisions have selfexecuting legal effect does not make them an act of legislation.172
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom
County recognized that treaty-allotted property “may be hard to square
with the requirement . . . that Congress’ intent to authorize state taxation
of Indians must be unmistakably clear.”173 The difference is more than
trivial. If the Seventh Circuit departs from the Sixth and Ninth, going for
a broad application of Cass County instead, it may further encourage the
Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split.
D. The Scope of the Indian Canons
To the extent that courts walk through the Indian canon analysis,
as opposed to treating alienation as blanket abrogation of treaty tax
immunity, they must determine how far to look for “unmistakably clear”
evidence of congressional intent. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, the Court considered a major shift in Indian policy eras,
as demonstrated by the IRA, to have a limiting effect on Congress’s
“intent” in the GAA, the keynote legislation of the previous era.174 Goudy
went even broader, essentially imputing commonly accepted property
concepts to Congress’s thinking,175 while retaining a textual statutory
analysis.176 And Yakima looked at the text and structure of the relevant
statutes, suggesting a narrower view.177
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As an example of this kind of interpretive problem, consider the
State’s argument, based on an assertion in Cass County, that the Tribes’
position on alienation would “render partially superfluous” portions of the
IRA.178 Those provisions explicitly grant tax immunity to former allotted
lands that the Secretary of Interior returns to federal trust status.179
Regardless of who is correct, the IRA could reasonably be interpreted as
merely reflecting the reality that so many lands had already been subjected
to state tax, irrespective of the legality of those actions. Yet the Court’s
interpretation of Congress’s intent in the IRA there—a law only indirectly
related to the case—had some bearing on its reasoning.
While it is probably appropriate that no single lens apply to what
can often be a fact-intensive inquiry to determine Congressional intent, the
subjectivity involved likely increases the temptation for the courts to
create more universal rules, such as the one in Cass County. As evidenced
in the on-point line of cases here, this tends to undercut the special
principles of Indian law that have been essential to the field for two
centuries.
One possible solution for the Seventh Circuit is to engage in
greater fact-finding by focusing on the Indian side of the canons—reading
treaty rights most favorably to the original signatories as they would have
understood them—rather than on the side of congressional intent. This
opens up a different set of ambiguities, but at least places the emphasis on
degrees of tribal sovereignty, not the extent of congressional power, an
important focus in the self-determination era.
Another answer may be simply letting the canons be canons: Keep
the bar required to overcome presumptions in favor of the Indians high, so
that it tends to resolve some questions of ambiguity regarding
congressional intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Not since City of Sherill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York has
the Supreme Court taken a close look at the taxability of former Indian
lands reacquired by a tribe or its members. Following the leading cases
would suggest that the question is settled. However, as is often the case in
Indian law, closer inspection reveals a tangle of competing principles,
complex histories, shifting statutory schemes, and piecemeal case law.
Often the outcome comes down to the court’s disposition toward Indian
law itself. Is it a singular field rooted in the structure of the unique
historical and political relationship between the United States and
indigenous peoples? Or a now-modernized set of law with wellestablished precedent and detailed rules, as applicable as any other? Or
some jagged combination of the two?
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This case’s implication of those questions raises a handful of
overarching issues: (1) How should the special Indian canons be cast
against common law property principles? (2) How wide (and deep) should
a court look when divining the intent of Congress per the Indian canons?
(3) What does alienability (and alienation) really mean in Indian country?
(4) Can the precedent as it relates to taxability of alienated fee lands
continue to rest on a seminal hundred-year-old case with vague reasoning?
(5) And if so, is that rule avoided wherever Indian lands are allotted by
treaty?
The Seventh Circuit here will probably stick with clearly stated
precedent in favor of the State, but the Sixth Circuit’s distinguishing of
Cass County opens up the possibility of limiting its application, especially
since the State there petitioned for cert. and was denied. Given the unusual
standalone strength of the alienability rule in the precedent line of cases
here, sometimes at odds with the Indian canons, it may be time for the high
court to revisit Goudy and its progeny.
On the other hand, since at least Yakima, and reaching back to
Goudy, states and local governments have relied on these rules to plan their
revenue streams. Still, the categorical rule in Cass County
notwithstanding, most tribal allotments occurred under the GAA, the
taxability of which is not in dispute here, nor is likely to ever be. Would it
be reasonable to return formerly allotted tribally owned lands to tax
immune status? Lac Courte may suggest an answer.

